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Security Challenges and Alliances in a New Era

Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Address to the American Chamber of Commerce, Auckland, New Zealand, August 6, 1991

I appreciate this opportunity to share with you some thoughts about the character of the remarkable times we are now living in—the end of the Cold War era—and our vision of the new world order that is slowly taking shape. I can't think of more dramatic examples of our times than the recent images of Mr. Gorbachev going to London bearing a program for market-oriented reform and democracy in the Soviet Union and then concluding a major arms reduction accord with President Bush in Moscow. History will no doubt record the recent G-7 and US-Soviet summits as major decision points in the quest for a post-war order. As the process of the Soviet Union's reconciliation with the West advances, we in the United States are also preparing to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Pacific war—where Americans and New Zealanders fought so valiantly together. Now, half a century later, we find ourselves at last beginning to close the books on the era of ideological competition and superpower military confrontation that emerged from that devastating global conflict. Indeed, the London and Moscow summits are but the latest events in a stunning cascade of developments that since 1989 have begun to transform our world: the evaporation of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and changes in the character of the Soviet Union that are enabling us to redefine US-Soviet relations and to move from confrontation to new forms of cooperation. These heartening developments reflect trends of global scope: the bankruptcy of communism as a political and economic system; worldwide economic integration sparked by spectacular technological change; and an equally widespread movement toward market-oriented economics, political pluralism, and concern with human rights. The impact of these trends now places us in one of those rare and probably brief periods of history where we—the United States and its allies and friends—have an opportunity to redefine institutions and realign patterns of cooperation. Together, we can build the foundations of an international system able to ensure that the new millennium we are about to enter will be a time of enhanced security, positive social change, and sustained economic development. At the same time, the recent war in the Persian Gulf has given us our first glimpse of the dark side of this new era. Whether in the Middle East, Yugoslavia, or the Soviet Union, we see dangerous counter-trends: a renascent ethno-nationalism and the re-emergence of regional antagonisms and rivalries long frozen over by the Cold War confrontation. Today, ambitious tyrants in various regions of the world have all-too-ready access to nuclear, missile, and other technologies with which to craft weapons of mass destruction. And Saddam use of terrorism and ecological aggression reinforced our well-established concerns about the environment and unconventional forms of warfare.

Post-Cold War Opportunities I will examine in a moment some of the implications for the future of both these key developments—the end of the Cold War and the Gulf conflict. But first let me note some of the positive opportunities before us as we seek to shape the contours of a new

international order. For the long term, the most important trend I see is the universalization of Western values. The widening acceptance of the concept of democracy, human rights, and economic liberty is evident not just in Eastern Europe and perhaps the Soviet Union but even in distant and land-locked Mongolia. The growing adoption of these values and principles holds the promise of creating what President Bush has called a "commonwealth of freedom." One important pillar of any new international order is an open global trade and investment regime. The success of the Uruguay Round of the GATT and regional initiatives such as APEC are critical to sustaining a global economic and financial environment that can accelerate economic growth worldwide and counter the dangers of protectionism. One need only look back to the experiences of the 1930s to see how deceptive the simplistic lure of economic nationalism and closed regional blocs can be. Communism's demise, and the resulting transformation of Europe, has also helped to catalyze a new and unprecedented phase of strategic arms reductions which is gradually moving us away from the tense nuclear confrontation that has dominated our **security** concerns these past four decades. Indeed, the progress we have made of late in controlling these fearsome weapons validates our reliance on the principle of global deterrence. Beginning with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty in 1988 and including the recently concluded Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and strategic arms reduction (START) accords, we are finally transforming the superpower strategic competition in a fundamental way. By last May, we and the Soviets had destroyed 2,700 declared intermediate range missiles, fulfilling that key aspect of our INF Treaty obligations. And the START accord mandates the reduction of over 7,600 US and Soviet warheads on strategic ballistic missiles. We are making equally dramatic progress in other areas of armscontrol. The recently concluded CFE accord will eliminate tens of thousands of tanks, combat aircraft, artillery, and combat helicopters in Europe upon full implementation. President Bush is committed to ridding the world of chemical weapons, an area of arms control where your Australian neighbors are playing a leading role. And we have established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) reflecting our growing efforts to constrain the spread of ballistic missiles. As we pursue our goals of a more secure and prosperous world order, the fate of the Soviet Union is currently at the center of our concerns and efforts. It is our hope that the Soviets will continue down the path of perestroika—toward free elections, free markets, and the free flow of people and ideas. The transformation of the Soviet Union will facilitate the goal Secretary Baker described recently in Berlin—that of building a "Euro-Atlantic community" from Vancouver east to Vladivostok.

Asian Trends The Asia-Pacific region has not been unaffected by the trends now transforming Europe. Asia moves at its own pace and in its own way; yet the same economic and political forces evident elsewhere have long been at work in this part of the world. During the 1980s, East Asia was the pace-setting region in the transformations of the information age. This past decade saw: — Japan's emergence as an economic superpower; — The high-tech, export-led growth of the newly industrializing "tigers" of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore; — Deng Xiaoping's economic opening up of China, which produced a decade of 10% annual growth—ironically and tragically creating the social and political pressures that exploded in Tienanmen Square 2 years ago; and — Transitions to democracy in the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and now even in Mongolia. Recently, we have begun to see new international relationships emerging in the Asia/Pacific region. Whether it be Sino-Soviet normalization, Secretary Baker making his second trip in a year to newly democratic Mongolia, South Korea normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and building new economic ties with China, or Mr. Gorbachev visiting Tokyo, change is clearly in the air. As the overlay of US-Soviet competition in the Pacific diminishes, East Asia's traditional multipolarity is becoming increasingly pronounced. This region is a complex **security** environment in which some of the largest armed forces in the world—those of the US, the USSR, China, Japan, North and South Korea, Vietnam, and India—are deployed in response to a variety of **security** concerns. In this changing environment, the primary rationale for our forward-deployed military presence is evolving as well. The Soviet dimension of our **security** concerns is diminishing, and regional issues are acquiring heightened prominence. Reflecting these new circumstances, our East Asia Strategy Initiative—presented to the Congress early last year—outlined force adjustments we are now undertaking in order to sustain an adequate forward-deployed **security** presence in the region into the coming century. The vast majority of countries in East Asia and the Pacific continue to look to the United States to play the role of regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate guarantor of stability and **security**. We share this view and accept the responsibility. And while the form of our **security** engagement will adjust to new realities, I can say unequivocally that we intend to retain the substance of this role and the bilateral defense relationships which give it structure. Our adaptation to new circumstances should not be misinterpreted as withdrawal. America's destiny lies across the Pacific. Our engagement in the region is here to stay. Despite the positive changes I have

Most prominently, the heavily armed standoff on the Korean peninsula remains one of the world's most dangerous confrontations. And now the prospect of nuclear proliferation on the peninsula constitutes the number one threat to **security** and stability in Northeast Asia. The unresolved dispute over the Soviet occupation of Japan's northern territories impedes normalization between Moscow and Tokyo, despite Mr. Gorbachev's historic visit to Japan this past April. In Southeast Asia, the Cambodia conflict is only now slowly heading toward resolution. The efforts of the five permanent members of the UN **Security** Council and the Paris Conference co-chairmen, together with the new climate of reconciliation amongst the Cambodian factions, offer hope that a just and durable peace may at long last be emerging. Such a development will pave the way for a new era in Indochina and open the door for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to join the mainstream of national development that is transforming Southeast Asia.

Asian Challenges Against this background, let me outline the challenges I see ahead in the Asia-Pacific theater if we are to enhance the relative stability of the region and promote a new cycle of economic growth. Nothing is more important to both **security** and prosperity in the Pacific than the US-Japan relationship. It is the keystone of our engagement in the Pacific. This relationship between the world's two largest and most technologically advanced economies—which together produce nearly 40% of the world's GNP—is multifaceted and vital to the effectiveness of the emerging international system. Our challenge is to sustain the US-Japan **security** alliance. We also welcome Japan's consideration of new responsibilities in global peacekeeping operations under the UN flag and disaster relief activities. At the same time, we are working to remove the impediments to a more balanced economic relationship. This will enable us to build a truly global partnership with Japan on solid political and economic foundations. We are also updating our other bilateral **security** alliances in the region—with the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and with Australia. In Korea, our robust ally of four decades is now progressing toward assumption of the lead role in its own defense, and in the Philippines we hope to conclude a bases agreement updated to reflect a new level of US-Philippine partnership. We must sustain our engagement with China and encourage it to resume its long march down the road of economic and political reform and to cooperate with us on regional issues of mutual concern such as Cambodia and Korea and on global issues such as nuclear and missile proliferation. One challenge of particular interest to our two countries—and one where **New Zealand's** engagement is especially important—is that of promoting economic development, social advance, and **protection** of the environment in the South Pacific. President Bush's unprecedented Honolulu summit last November with the leaders of 11 Pacific island nations and the initiatives he undertook in the areas of trade, aid, and investment reflect our strong interest in the Pacific islands. Only a few days ago, I attended the South Pacific post-forum dialogue in Kolonia. Our two countries play complementary roles in the forum and other multilateral institutions such as the Regional Environment Program. We look forward to expanding cooperation with **New Zealand** in this geographically dispersed but important part of the world. The single most important factor shaping the Asia-Pacific region today is the remarkable dynamism of the Pacific Rim economies. In our view, it is interdependent economic growth that holds the greatest promise of bringing an enhanced sense of community to the Asia-Pacific region. This is particularly true at a time when technological and commercial capabilities more than military strength are becoming the most relevant measures of national power and influence. For the United States, trans-Pacific trade—now over $300 billion annually— is one-third larger than that across the Atlantic. Like the United States, **New Zealand** is also a maritime trading nation. We share the challenge of maintaining an open system of commerce and investment that has been the engine of global economic growth, and **New Zealand's** efforts in the Cairns group of the GATT demonstrate the importance you attach—along with the US—to strengthening a liberalized trading regime of worldwide scope. In the Pacific, however, economic growth has outpaced mechanisms and institutions to manage its varied political, environmental, and social effects. This is why the US joined together with Australia, **New Zealand**, and nine other nations of the Pacific Basin to promote economic cooperation based on free market principles by forming APEC—the initiative for enhancing the economic structure of regional integration. APEC is also an important rallying point for support of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. And the work programs of APEC are demonstrating, in practical terms, why the economies of the Pacific Basin share a common future. In addition to these economic concerns, we also face such challenges to our collective well-being as protecting the environment, managing refugee flows, defending against terrorism, and suppressing the global traffic in illicit narcotics. Such transnational issues have now moved high on our common agenda.

The Challenge of Collective **Security** As we begin to grapple with the challenges that are shaping the world of tomorrow, it is important to take stock of what made possible the achievements in Western economic growth, **security**, and arms control I have discussed and how those lessons apply to our future efforts. Looking back at the Cold War era and, more recently, the Gulf conflict, the importance of alliances based on shared values and common interests stands out sharply. As revelation after revelation about past Soviet behavior surfaces in this age of glasnost, the value of deterrence becomes increasingly evident. Deterrence pursued by the United States and its allies limited opportunities for aggression and helped bring the weight of socialism's failures down on the Soviet system. Now a Europe whole and free enjoying the benefits of collective **security** is finally possible. And I must point out here that even as the Warsaw Pact has been relegated to history's dustbin, NATO continues to thrive, remodeling itself to meet the demands of a new era. Reflecting on the Persian Gulf conflict, several points are worthy of emphasis: the confrontation with Saddam Hussein demonstrated America's determination to work with the member states of the UN in responding to a threat to collective **security** in a distant part of the globe. The United States was not the Lone Ranger. President Bush mobilized a consensus in the United Nations and a coalition on the ground in Saudi Arabia to defend the fundamental principles of the rule of law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The Gulf conflict demonstrated the renewed vitality of the United Nations and the prospect of the UN fulfilling the role originally envisioned for the world body by its founders. The promise of an effective global system of collective **security** offers particular hope for the **security** of smaller nations. In the Gulf conflict, Saddam Hussein gave us a disturbing lesson in the **security** challenges we face as ambitious leaders of smaller states exploit their all-too-ready access to ballistic missiles, nuclear technology, and other weapons of mass destruction in pursuit of aggressive designs. **New Zealand's** positive support for the UN coalition during the Gulf crisis demonstrated a farsighted view of the country's national interest and gave a ringing endorsement to the concept of collective **security**. Let me say here that **New Zealand's** military contributions to Desert Storm were recognized and sincerely appreciated. The deployment of transport aircraft and medical personnel reaffirmed **New Zealand's** longstanding commitment to the principles and peacekeeping activities of the United Nations. Indeed, **New Zealand** has a rich tradition of support for collective **security** efforts. Looking back to World War II, the outstanding contributions of New Zealanders in the European, Middle East, and Pacific theaters readily come to mind. Here in Auckland, I particularly want to salute a local hero, Royal Air Force Vice Marshall Keith Park, who with hundreds of other New Zealanders served in the RAF, contributing to the success of the Battle of Britain 50 years ago. Their exploits and sacrifices are an enduring reminder of the guts and grit displayed in the Allied fight against fascist tyranny—one of the many instances in which our two nations have fought shoulder to shoulder. As Foreign Minister Don McKinnon has pointed out, during this century a quarter of a million **New Zealand** troops have fought overseas in two world wars, in Korea, and in Southeast Asia. The global trends for change I have outlined, for all their promise, also underscore the undiminished need for cooperative **security** efforts in the times ahead. Whether it be the danger of nuclear proliferation in Iraq, on the Indian subcontinent, or in East Asia, preserving the environment, or combating drugs and terrorism, the logic of common action in support of collective **security** is no less valid today than it was during the darkest days of World War II or during the decades of Cold War. **New Zealand's** voice is given weight and outreach in world affairs by its participation in the multilateral institutions of the international system—in the Cairns group of the GATT, the Group of 24, or in the United Nations. **New Zealand's** voice has credibility in the GATT because it is a full member respecting all the rules of the GATT regime. This same principle must also apply to the areas of defense and **security**. The uncertainty and dangers of the post-Cold War world—for all its opportunities as well—require steadiness of purpose which our alliances gain from shared values and common interests.

US-**New Zealand** But alliances a la carte will not work. Nor can one member of an alliance adopt policies that compromise the ability of an ally to meet its responsibilities and still expect to enjoy the benefits of collective **security**. Shared responsibilities and shared benefits are but two sides of the same coin. The building blocks of Asian **security** in the era now unfolding will be primarily America's bilateral alliance relationships. As we saw in the Gulf, the ability of the United States to meet its commitments globally and regionally still depends on the credibility of our deterrent forces and on freedom of the seas. These factors for credibility and mobility are in **New Zealand's** interest no less than our own. Infringements on the freedom of movement of our naval forces, particularly if they inspire restrictions in other areas of the world, would seriously

impair not only our ability to meet our treaty obligations but also our capacity to act as the "balancing wheel" in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, our policy of neither-confirm-nor-deny (NCND) is important to meeting our alliance commitments in Asia as in Europe. Adopting policies which impair **New Zealand's** ability to fulfill its collective **security** obligations under the ANZUS pact does more than prohibit the visits of American or British ships. It denies **New Zealand** access to joint training opportunities, **security** intelligence, and the most advanced defense technologies. It also deprives **New Zealand** of its proper voice in shaping future regional and global **security** arrangements. Let me be clear: **New Zealand** is an important democratic friend. We want your voice to be fully heard in the councils that are shaping the world of the 21st century. In this regard, I should add that we have taken note of the efforts of the present **New Zealand** Government to reject isolationism and to define **New Zealand's** foreign policy interests in the broad, global terms appropriate to a maritime, trading nation in this ever-more interdependent world. The Bolger Government's recent defense white paper clearly outlines a strategy of wider engagement in **security** areas—a view we welcome. Prime Minister Bolger recently pointed out that **New Zealand's** decision to ban from its ports certain naval vessels from nuclear-capable nations has not halted the expansion of nuclear weapons. What is reversing the proliferation of these instruments of mass destruction is arms control agreements negotiated with the strength and solidarity of our vital alliances. The transformations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the achievement of substantial arms reductions through the CFE and START accords demonstrate that collective **security** has worked. Deterrence and its corollary, NCND, have worked. Tomorrow's sources of aggression may be different from those of the Cold War era. But they will be no less threatening to our **security**. Tomorrow's nuclear threats will be from the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world. And banning ships of friends and allies—forces needed to help deter the proliferating danger of nuclear and missile forces in the Third World—benefits no one. How **New Zealand** resolves the dilemma it has created with its allies because of its anti-nuclear legislation is a matter for New Zealanders to decide. I can say that for our part, the United States wants a fully restored relationship with **New Zealand**—one that will allow us to work closely with the confidence of full allies in pursuit of mutual **security** interests and obligations. And only **New Zealand** can take the steps needed to make this a reality. For the present, we are committed to sustaining cooperative relations with **New Zealand** outside the areas of **security** and defense. In matters of economics, the environment, and political affairs, we will continue to collaborate as friends and with the hope that the fully normal ties of close allies will not be long in coming.

Conclusion We are fortunate to be living in a time of great promise and opportunity. The ascendancy of the values of democracy, human rights, and free markets bodes well for the future. In East Asia and the Pacific, a new sense of community is growing based on the region's economic dynamism and its integration through trade. As we have done in wars both hot and cold, we want to stand shoulder to shoulder with **New Zealand** in the struggle for **security**, prosperity, and human rights as we advance into the post-Cold War era. It is our hope that **New Zealand** will join us as full partners as we shape the world of the 21st century.(###)